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Comment
Associated Press v. Meltwater: Are Courts Being
Fair to News Aggregators?
Dylan J. Quinn*
The Associated Press (AP), a news cooperative, filed suit
against Meltwater U.S. Holdings (Meltwater), a news
aggregation service, for copyright infringement.1 Meltwater
conceded that sending its clients snippets of AP articles was
copyright infringement, but contended that its use of the
copyrighted articles constituted fair use under the Copyright
Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).2 In the alternative, Meltwater
argued that AP had granted an implied license to redistribute
the copyrighted articles.3 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York (SDNY) held that
Meltwater’s scraping of the Internet and sending snippets in a
“news report” to clients was not fair use and that an implied
license did not exist.4 This represents the first time a district
court has ruled against a news aggregator by denying a fair use
defense.5 Meltwater appealed to the Second Circuit, but the
© 2014 Dylan J. Quinn
* JD Candidate, 2015, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Gregory C. Brown for the invaluable guidance and advice.
1. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
2. Id. at 541.
3. Id. at 561. AP actually filed six causes of action, but the copyright
infringement claim was the central cause of action and only relevant claim for
this analysis. Id. at 548.
4. Id. at 561 (holding that Meltwater was essentially a news clipping
service that served as a substitute for the original article, that its use of the
snippets was not “transformative,” and that the rejection of fair use furthered
the purpose of the Copyright Act).
5. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation &
Public Knowledge in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2–8, Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings,
Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-1087-DLC-FM)
[hereinafter Brief of Elec. Frontier Found.], available at https://www.eff.org/
node/73059 (discussing previous case law on the finding of fair use for news
aggregators).
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case was settled while waiting on appeal.6 The settlement
provides that AP and Meltwater will begin working together in
the future.7
The court in AP v. Meltwater denied the fair use defense
because Meltwater’s use was not transformative and effectively
substituted for AP in the market,8 while the implied license
defense was denied for both practical and policy reasons.9 The
decision, although possibly providing the right outcome on
these specific facts, presents a questionable interpretation of
what is “transformative,”10 unconvincingly argues against the
feasibility of an expanded implied license defense, and leaves
questions going forward in terms of what differentiates a
search engine that is afforded fair use and one that is not.
In general, the court’s analysis of Meltwater’s fair use
defense is important because it provides a look into how a court
would apply the standard to a news aggregator. It has long
been assumed that news aggregators are protected from news
organizations and content providers by the fair use defense,11
but this case provides evidence to the contrary. Furthermore,
although the ruling correctly denied Meltwater’s fair use
defense under current Second Circuit precedent,12 an expanded
implied license doctrine in the context of online news media

6. AP, Meltwater Settle Copyright Dispute, USA TODAY (July 29, 2013,
11:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/29/apmeltwater-settle-copyright-dispute/2595769/ [hereinafter Associated Press]
(discussing the cooperative agreement between AP and Meltwater that was
agreed upon prior to appeal).
7. Id.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See Brief of Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 5, at 2–10 (arguing that
the AP’s proposed interpretation of “transformative use” is too narrow and will
stifle news aggregators and search engines from distributing news content to
the public); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–22 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining the transformative use of news articles employed by search
engines and their benefit to the public).
11. See Nicole Marimon, Shutting Down the Turbine: How the News
Industry and News Aggregators Can Coexist in a Post-Barclays v.
Theflyonthewall.com World, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1441, 1472–74 (2013) (assuming other remedies are needed for news providers
since the fair use defense provides protection for news aggregators).
12. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 550–61, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing Second Circuit precedent and
holding that “Meltwater ha[d] failed to raise a material question of fact to
support its fair use defense”).
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presents an intriguing alternative to traditional copyright
law.13
The goal of this Comment is to discuss the impact, if any,
the case will have on the relationship between news
aggregators and news providers, and whether courts should
apply the fair use factors in the same manner as the Meltwater
court. Part I will introduce the current state of the online news
industry, the fair use and implied license defenses, as well as
the impact of news aggregators on news reporting. Part II will
describe the Meltwater court’s holding and analysis. Part III
will critique the court’s interpretation of “transformative use”
and discuss implications and policy concerns regarding search
engines and news aggregators.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. THE NEWS INDUSTRY’S ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON THE
INTERNET
The Internet seems to have altered every industry in some
way, and the news industry is no exception. It is not that news
providers are not attempting to effectively use the Internet; to
the contrary, online revenues are at an all-time high.14 The
main problem is attempting to capitalize on the Internet
market so that the gains in online revenue make up for the
decreases in print.15 Furthermore, while more sophisticated
13. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–16 (D. Nev. 2006)
(finding no copyright infringement where the copyright holder knew of the
ability to opt out of a search engine by being able to cache and index the
copyrighted material); Monika Isia Jasiewicz, Comment, Copyright Protection
in an Opt-Out World: Implied License Doctrine and News Aggregators, 122
YALE L.J. 837, 843–50 (2012) (arguing that the law should develop an opt-out
standard, effectively allowing the implied use defense).
14. Rick Edmonds et al., The State of the News Media 2012, Newspapers:
By the Numbers, STATEOFTHEMEDIA.ORG, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/
newspapers-building-digital-revenues-proves-painfully-slow/newspapers-bythe-numbers/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
15. See id. (demonstrating that over the last two years the increases in
online revenue did not make up for the losses in print). Furthermore, it is
worth noting that print still comprises about 86.4% of overall revenue. Id.
(taking the print revenue for 2011 divided by the total print and online
revenue provides the 86.4%); see also Keiyana Fordham, Note, Can
Newspapers Be Saved? How Copyright Law Can Save Newspapers from the
Challenges of New Media, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939,
942–43 (2010) (discussing how newspapers used to hold a monopoly over
providing news and connecting buyers and sellers through print advertising,

1192

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

players may be better able to adapt to new trends, media
outlets with less funding are being forced to close their doors.16
While there is a seemingly infinite amount of variables leading
to the industry’s inability to effectively capture revenue from
its online media services, many believe that news aggregators
are a leading cause.17 Amongst the various methods employed
by news providers to combat aggregators, an actual judgment
for copyright infringement against an aggregator may alleviate
news providers’ concerns about news aggregators.
The term “news aggregator” can encompass a variety of
websites and online services, but most aggregators can be
boiled down into two categories that both provide a middleman
in between the original source and the consumer: “automatic”
and “websites.”18 Automatic news aggregators operate using a
search engine that automatically indexes copies of the articles
it scrapes from the Internet, compiles headlines and excerpts,
while providing a link to the original source.19 Website news
aggregators perform similarly, but actually use a human editor,
often adding commentary, summary, and insight to go along

but advertising is now migrating to the Internet); AP Sees Slight Revenue
Decline in 2012, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.ap.org/
Content/AP-In-The-News/2013/AP-sees-slight-revenue-decline-in-2012
(discussing the AP’s loss in revenues, and the need to severely cut back on
operating costs and payroll).
16. See Edmonds et al., supra note 14 (noting that over the past five
years, fourteen to twenty-one newspapers shut down annually).
17. See, e.g., David Sarno, Murdoch Accuses Google of News ‘Theft’, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/02/business/la-finews-google2-2009dec02 (discussing Robert Murdoch’s statements that
aggregators use of news providers’ material is equivalent to theft).
18. See Fordham, supra note 15, at 946, 947–51 (stating that “[t]his Note
will focus on two types of news aggregators: automatic news aggregators, and
news aggregation websites”); see also Priya Barnes, The Prospects for
Protecting News Content Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 3 HARV.
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 201, 206–07 (2012) (distinguishing between “feed”
aggregators, which compile news items from a variety of sources on multiple
topics, and “specialty” aggregators, which compile news on particular topics).
Barnes uses the terms “pure-play” and “hybrid” to represent “automatic” and
“website,” respectively. Id.
19. Fordham, supra note 15, at 947. Search engines like Google News are
an example, but so is the defendant in Meltwater. The defining characteristic
is that no new commentary or insight is added to the original source. See id.
(describing what is listed on automatic news aggregators’ websites, all of
which comes from the original source).
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with the original source.20 These categories are not exclusive,
and as the industry evolves there will undoubtedly be a
blending between the two. While some have categorized news
aggregators into four categories,21 for the purposes of this
Comment the main distinction will be drawn between those
that add their own expressive content (websites), and those
that automatically scrape the Internet and just republish
pieces of the original source (automatic).
News providers take the position that their publications,
which take hours (maybe even days) to complete, are being
exploited by aggregators who scrape the Internet and republish
the work to their own consumers.22 This, news providers say,
reduces consumer traffic to their sites, undermines their ability
to get advertising revenue,23 and is akin to thievery.24 All the
while, aggregators point out that they serve a valuable public
purpose in that they further disseminate information, which
leads to a more informed public.25
Although it seems intuitive that news aggregators
undermine the ability of news providers to operate in the
market by attracting visitors away from the provider and to the
aggregator, there is disagreement about whether this is
20. See id. at 948–51 (describing how news aggregation websites operate
and discussing, as an example, how a Gawker employee re-wrote a
Washington Post article). The Huffington Post is a great example of this type
of aggregator. While the categories seem mutually exclusive, aggregators may
blur the lines between them, further complicating the legal framework and
analysis of the issue discussed infra.
21. Marimon, supra note 11, at 1447 (distinguishing between feed,
specialty, user-curated, and blog aggregators).
22. See Fordham, supra note 15, at 950.
23. Id. at 942–43. But see Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 841 (“[T]here
appears to be no direct empirical evidence that news aggregators are actively
cutting into the news industry’s advertising revenue.”).
24. Sarno, supra note 17 (quoting News Corporation chairman Rupert
Murdoch accusing aggregators of “almost wholesale misappropriation” that
“[t]o be impolite, [is] theft”).
25. See Brief of Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 5, at 1. In support of
aggregators, the amicus brief argues that a ruling against aggregators’ fair
use defense would “sharply curtail the essential role fair use plays in
facilitating online innovation and expression, restricting the use and
development of services that allow users to find, organize and share public
information.” Id. These valuable services that are offered are dependent on
making intermediate copies and personal consumer uses such as time shifting.
Id.; see also Barnes, supra note 18, at 209 (“By increasing consumers’ choice of
access to the same information, news aggregators may provide a balancing
pressure for dominant media to be less biased in their coverage.”).
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actually the case.26 It appears that the revenue declines are not
attributed so much to a lack of readership, as much as losses in
advertising revenue.27 It is unclear if aggregators are actually
taking away viewers from the original news provider as
opposed to increasing traffic to the original source.28 As
aggregators are becoming more prevalent on the Internet, the
news industry has fought back, responding in various ways,
like using paywalls and licensing organizations.29 The problem
is that paywalls and online subscriptions are not working since
not many people are willing to pay for the news.30 As attempts
of erecting paywalls fail, it is logical to assume that legal action
against news aggregators is the next step. While legal action
has led to settlement agreements which provide that the

26. See Edmonds et al., supra note 14 (noting that circulation losses are
much less severe, indicating that the audience isn’t so much diminishing as
much as advertising revenue is); see also Hsiang Iris Chyi & Angela M. Lee,
Online News Consumption: A Structural Model Linking Preference, Use, and
Paying Intent, 1 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 194, 196 (2013) (discussing research
that shows “online newspaper use serves [as] entertainment, interpersonal
communication . . . and information scanning,” indicating consumers are not
interested in reading full articles on the Internet). Chyi & Lee conclude that
consumers also are typically not willing to even pay for the news source
(especially online) that the consumer prefers, illustrating the problem with
news providers using paywalls and trying to collect revenue directly from
online consumers. See id. at 206.
27. See Susan Athey & Markus Mobius, Local News Consumption: The
Impact of Aggregators on Traditional Media, TECH. ACADEMICS POL’Y
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/August-2012/Local-NewsConsumption-The-Impact-of-Aggregators-o.aspx (summarizing research that
indicates aggregators may lead to increased local news consumption, but at
the same time may be taking away from advertising revenue since clicking
directly through to the article bypasses the news provider’s home page).
28. See id.
29. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 542–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the numerous websites and
aggregators that pay for license agreements with the Associated Press);
Barnes, supra note 18, at 211–13 (2012) (discussing the various paywalls and
digital access regimes employed by online news providers); Marimon, supra
note 11, at 1449 (discussing NewsRight, a partnership licensing organization
started by twenty-nine news organizations in 2011 with the goal of collecting
royalties from aggregators).
30. Chyi & Lee, supra note 26, at 197 (discussing an international survey
that shows approximately 80% of people would not pay for online news
content). The study by Chyi & Lee shows that, overall, even if people prefer
and desire to read certain news content, that does not make them more willing
to pay. Id. at 205–06.
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aggregator is to pay the provider a licensing fee,31 there is
obviously no way a news provider can go after the thousands of
websites that use its content. It is possible that an adverse
judgment against a news aggregator for copyright infringement
could dispel the notion that aggregators are protected under
fair use, sending a message across the industry, but it is
unclear if aggregators will actually respond to the message and
change their business model.
B. THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND FAIR USE ON THE INTERNET
Although the Copyright Act has continually been employed
by news providers in recent years to go after search engines
and news aggregators, the industry has historically relied on
other doctrines for protection.32 About a century ago, AP won
the landmark case International News Service v. Associated
Press.33 The case created the “hot news” doctrine, which was
intended to protect the time value of the news as a way to
counteract unfair competition,34 all the while seemingly
dismissing the idea of a copyrightable interest in the news.35
Today, the hot news doctrine is a toothless cause of action that
is completely inadequate in light of recent Second Circuit
precedent.36
If the hot news doctrine cannot be utilized by news
providers, they can and are turning to the Copyright Act.37
Some have raised concerns that the Copyright Act is

31. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Neuburger, A Brief History of AP’s Battles with
News Aggregators, PBS (May 26, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/
2009/05/a-brief-history-of-aps-battles-with-news-aggregators146/ (discussing a
2006 settlement between Google and AP which required Google to pay
undisclosed licensing fees for the use of AP’s content).
32. Id. (discussing the hot news doctrine).
33. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918)
(ruling against International News Service, holding that International News
Service engaged in unfair competition by republishing the news procured by
AP).
34. Neuburger, supra note 31.
35. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234–35 (“We need spend no time,
however, upon the general question of property in the news matter at common
law, or the application of the copyright act, since it seems to us the case must
turn upon the question of unfair competition . . . .”).
36. See Marimon, supra note 11, at 1460–61 (discussing how Barclay
Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) leaves
only a “ghostly presence” of International News Service v. AP).
37. See, e.g., Neuburger, supra note 31.
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inadequate in preventing aggregators from republishing
content38 since the Act expressly mentions “news reporting”
under permissible fair uses.39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has made clear that printing facts alone without some
originality or creativity in their compilation is not
copyrightable expression.40 Notwithstanding the alleged
shortcomings of the Copyright Act, it has been employed by
news providers in recent years41 and very well may represent
the best weapon news providers have against aggregators.
The Copyright Act was adopted to advance the arts and
sciences by providing exclusive rights in an author’s work.42 In
order to prevail in a copyright infringement action, a copyright
holder must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”43
The bar is set low for authors/creators to gain copyright
protection in their work, but that does not mean they will
necessarily prevail since the Act allows for a fair use
affirmative defense.
The fair use defense is the most frequently invoked defense
for those defending against allegations of copyright
infringement.44 The fair use defense was codified into the
Copyright Act from judicial precedent.45 Although the purpose

38. See id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
40. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–64 (1991)
(holding that the re-publishing of names, telephone numbers, and directory
information was not a copyrightable work since it lacked the originality
required for copyright protection); Marimon, supra note 11, at 1463–64
(discussing the shortcomings of the Copyright Act to protect the news industry
in light of Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.).
41. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F.
Supp. 2d 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
42. See generally A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014)
(explaining that copyright means “that body of exclusive rights granted by law
to authors for the protection of their work”).
43. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Feist Publications, 449 U.S. at 361).
44. Fordham, supra note 15, at 951 (“When copyright owners seek to
enforce their rights in court against infringers of their copyrighted works, the
most commonly raised defense is fair use.”).
45. See id. (“Fair use is a judicial construct, codified into law at section
107 of the 1976 Copyright Act . . . .”). See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (distilling judicial precedent into
the four factors that were eventually codified into the Copyright Act of 1976).
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of copyright is to “promote science and the arts,”46 fair use
provides the necessary breathing room to avoid rigid
application of the statute by allowing courts to weigh various
factors on a case-by-case basis.47 In granting an affirmative fair
use defense, a court is to consider
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.48

All of the factors are “to be explored, and the results weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”49
Copyright infringement suits involving the Internet are
not unique to the news industry,50 but courts’ analyses of the
fair use factors in the context of search engines, news
aggregators, and online media are most relevant for this
comment.51 Recent cases dealing with a search engine’s
proposed fair use of copyrighted materials provides guidance
into how a court would treat a news aggregator.52 Case law
46. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
47. Id. at 577–78.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The first factor includes a two-part test to
establish if the secondary use is for a commercial purpose and if the use is
transformative. Fordham, supra note 15, at 953. After the Supreme Court’s
holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., lower courts put much less of
an emphasis on whether or not the secondary use is for a commercial purpose.
Id. at 953–54. The second factor is normally given the least weight in a court’s
analysis. Id. at 954–55.
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
50. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,
900–01 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (ruling against Napster’s fair use defense and in favor
of music publishers); see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104,
106 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding retransmission of radio broadcasts over the
telephone did not constitute fair use).
51. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293–94
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), for the most recent SDNY case that has a direct impact on
this Comment. The court in Authors Guild found that Google’s mass
digitization of copyrighted books was fair use since converting the text into a
digital format was transformative and the project constituted a massive
benefit to society. Id.
52. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–68 (9th
Cir. 2007) (granting search engine’s fair use defense of copyrighted images in
search queries since the cached and index copy of the image did not supplant
the need for the original and because of the public benefit provided by search
engines); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2002)
(ruling that the search engine’s use of thumbnails in response to search
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indicates that search engines, like Google, are protected by fair
use due to the limited use of the copyrighted material53 and the
immense benefit they afford society by increasing access to
information.54 While aggregators can serve a similar function
as search engines,55 not all aggregators are the same.56
Aggregators can vary from search engines by charging a fee to
consumers, using more of the copyrighted content, adding
additional content, or by summarizing copyrighted content.57
While case law indicates that search engines are afforded fair
use, it is unclear how courts will differentiate between
aggregators or other online media services that have functions
similar to that of a search engine.
C. IN ADDITION TO FAIR USE, AGGREGATORS ARE NOW
TURNING TO AN IMPLIED LICENSE DEFENSE
While aggregators will heavily rely on fair use, the news
providers themselves may look for protection from other
sources outside of the Copyright Act. Some have argued that
the news providers should lobby for new legislation targeted at
aggregators.58 However, any additional legislation targeted at
news aggregators has obvious First Amendment implications
that must be considered.59 Some have discussed whether or not
the news industry could find relief under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,60 but it is uncertain if this would be
queries was fair since the tiny version of the original image did not supplant
the need for the original, the thumbnails were transformative, and because of
the public benefit such search engines provide).
53. Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 286–87.
54. See, e.g., id. at 293–94.
55. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, 931 F. Supp. 2d 537,
563–64 (mentioning that news aggregator employed the same “crawlers” to
scan the Internet as search engines, and provides results to customers’ search
queries).
56. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (discussing the
different types of news aggregators).
57. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. This list is by no
means exhaustive.
58. See Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary First Amendment Analysis of
Legislation Treating News Aggregation as Copyright Infringement, 12 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 947, 971 (2010).
59. Id. at 959–72 (discussing the impact of protecting ideas in news
articles on free speech, and the fact that any aggregation control legislation
would be analyzed under elevated First Amendment scrutiny).
60. See Barnes, supra note 18, at 208; Neuburger, supra note 31
(discussing a district court’s ruling that “AP could pursue a claim under the
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possible.61 Even with these other potential avenues, the most
prevalent for the foreseeable future is the Copyright Act.
Although the Copyright Act and the fair use defense is the
primary statute (or doctrine) governing these type of suits,62 an
implied license affirmative defense63 has been gaining traction.
Since it is a non-exclusive license, it does not need to be in
writing.64 Furthermore, it is a creature of contract law,
meaning its existence primarily hinges on the party’s
intentions.65 A common standard for demonstrating an implied
license requires the alleged infringer to show that (1) the
licensee requests the creation of the work; (2) the creator
makes the particular work and delivers it to the licensee who
requested it; and (3) the licensor intends that the licenseerequester copy and distribute his or her work.66 It appears a
court using the three-factor test would always rule against a
news aggregator since the aggregator will have a difficult time
showing they requested the work directly, and it was delivered
to them via that request. However, not all courts follow this
exact standard, and instead employ a more fluid standard
focusing on the conduct and intentions of the parties.67
copyright management provision of the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act]” if
the defendant “removed references to the AP as owner and author of the
articles that it copied”).
61. Barnes overlooks the fact that the statute is geared towards antitrafficking and the circumvention of safeguards in place, but by crawling the
Internet there is no circumvention of a pay-wall or anything.
62. See Fordham, supra note 15, at 947–48, 951.
63. See, e.g., Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(“[A]lleged infringers have the burden of establishing an implied license.”).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (leaving out nonexclusive licenses from the
definition of “transfer of copyright ownership”); id. § 204 (stating attempted
transfers of copyright ownership must be made in writing).
65. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Since an implied license is a creature of contract
law, the parties’ intent is a critical factor.”).
66. See Beholder Prods., Inc. v. Catona, 629 F. Supp. 2d 490, 494 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (stating that “the Third Circuit referenced a three-factor test adopted by
numerous other circuits (including the 9th, the 7th, the 5th and the D.C.
Circuits) to determine whether or not an implied license was granted” and
then listing and discussing the three factors). In Effects Associates the Court
found an implied license granted by the special effects company to the
moviemaker, the alleged infringer. Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555,
558–59 (9th Cir. 1990).
67. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (“Even those courts that do not
require evidence of each of these three elements do require evidence of a
meeting of the minds between the licensor and licensee such that it is fair to
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Furthermore, it would not be out of the question for a
jurisdiction to tweak the three-factor requirement to satisfy the
needs of the particular industry, since it has been done
before.68
The leading example of a case utilizing a more expansive
implied license standard that is relevant to news aggregators,
is Field v. Google.69 In that case the District Court in Nevada
agreed with Google that the copyright holder granted an
implied license since it was aware of an industry standard that
could have been employed to adequately prevent the search
engine from using the copyrighted material, but failed to utilize
it.70 This logic could seemingly be applied to all news service
providers, meaning they would effectively have to “opt out” of
having aggregators and search engines use their copyrighted
works.71 Although there are questions about the feasibility of
creating an industry wide opt-out system using the implied
license doctrine,72 the argument provides a possible framework
going forward for dealing with the complicated relationship
between news providers and aggregators outside of fair use and
the Copyright Act.

infer that the licensor intended to grant a nonexclusive license.”); see also 2
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:131 (2013) (discussing the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’
different variations and acceptable demonstrations of an implied license
outside of the three factors commonly applied).
68. Since courts have altered the three factors to better suit industry
practices in the film industry, what would stop a court from recognizing the
unique nature of the news and the necessity to make a different standard? See
Fontana v. Harra, No. CV 12-10708 CAS, 2013 WL 990014, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 12, 2013).
69. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113–16 (D. Nev. 2006)
(granting Google’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on an implied license
defense since the copyright holder was aware of the industry standard which
allows website owners to employ a meta-tag, which informs a search engine
scraping the Internet not to pull that source).
70. Id. at 1115–16.
71. See Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 843–47 (discussing how the Internet
is an opt-out system, while traditional copyright law is an opt-in system where
distribution rights prohibit reproduction without copyright holders
affirmatively providing their consent).
72. E.g., id. at 845 (stating that “[h]istorically, implied licenses have only
been found in copyright cases when there is direct dealing between just a few
parties” and not in any context comparable to the Internet).
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D. IT IS UNCLEAR IF COURTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
AGGREGATORS OFTEN INCREASE NEWS CONSUMPTION AND
PROVIDE A BENEFIT TO SOCIETY
Even if the Copyright Act affords some protection, it is odd
that many cases settle.73 News providers presumably would
want to set precedent in their favor and get rid of the long-held
belief that aggregators are protected under fair use. It is
without question that thousands of websites reuse news
content without permission;74 however it is quite possible that
the news providers do not want constricting legislation that
will impair aggregators from coming into the market place.
Publishers of news content may actually want aggregators,
since they recognize the value of having their information
reach a larger consumer base.75 This is supported by the fact
that most settlements involving news providers and search
engines (or news aggregators) lead to a mutually beneficial
agreement, normally involving the payment of licensing fees.76
Therefore it is questionable if any news provider actually cares
about securing an adverse judgment against a news
aggregator; that may be because they understand the positive
impact and benefit they provide society by further
disseminating information.
Recent research supports the notion that news aggregation
services likely increase the traffic to the original news
providers and increase overall news consumption by
consumers.77 One research study showed that when Google
73. E.g., Kimberly Isbell, What’s the Law Around Aggregating News
Online? A Harvard Law Report on the Risks and the Best Practices, NIEMAN
JOURNALISM LAB (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/
09/whats-the-law-around-aggregating-news-online-a-harvard-law-report-onthe-risks-and-the-best-practices/ (discussing AP v. All Headline News, the
copyright claims maintained in the SDNY, and the eventual settlement).
74. See Marimon, supra note 11, at 1446–47 (discussing research that
estimates that 75,000 websites reuse newspaper content without permission
across the country).
75. See Mark Sableman, News Aggregation Services—Legal and Practical
BUS.
INFO.
&
MEDIA
COMPANIES,
Perspectives,
ASS’N
http://www.abmassociation.com/images/abm/pdfs/News%20Aggregation%20H
andout.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
76. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 6 (discussing the settlement
between AP and Meltwater that led to a cooperative agreement between AP
and the news aggregator).
77. See LESLEY CHIOU & CATHERINE E. TUCKER, NEWS, COPYRIGHT, AND
ONLINE AGGREGATORS 3 (2010), available at http://arrow.hunter.cuny.edu/
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News dropped its use of AP content in 2009 due to an ongoing
dispute, the traffic to websites containing the AP content
significantly decreased.78 It is not a surprise that many assume
news aggregators take away consumer traffic from news
providers; however research indicates aggregators may actually
increase traffic to the original site.79 In addition they may lead
viewers to a wider variety of news providers and increase
overall news consumption,80 which has been cited by
policymakers as increasing civic engagement.81 As courts apply
the Copyright Act and analyze the various fair use factors, it is
important that the courts acknowledge the public benefits
provided by news aggregators, all while understanding that the
news aggregators may actually aid news providers by
increasing traffic to their websites.
In recent years there has been an increase in copyright
litigation brought by news providers against news aggregators,
but not one case has reached a decision.82 There is likely a
feeling that neither side could afford an adverse judgment since
it could have an immense ripple effect across the industry. As a
policy matter, courts should acknowledge the benefit provided
to society by news aggregation services, and allow such
acknowledgement to shape outcomes of copyright infringement
suits. The judgment rendered against Meltwater U.S. Holdings
is the first copyright infringement ruling against a news
aggregator.83 By denying the fair use defense and the existence

media-economics-workshop/conference-papers/chiou%20and%20tucker%
20news.pdf (“Our finding suggests that the aggregation of news content
actually complements the original content. In other words, users are more
likely to be provoked to seek the original source and read further when they
come across a story summarized by an aggregator, rather than being merely
content with the summary.”); see also Athey & Mobius, supra note 27
(discussing the research study where French consumers began using Google
News, which led to an increase in news consumption and traffic to local news
sites). It is conceded that these examples pertain to Google News, which is
obviously one of the most widely used aggregation services, and the results
may not be directly applicable to smaller and less widely used aggregators.
78. CHIOU & TUCKER, supra note 77, at 19 (citing a research study that
showed about a 20% decrease in traffic).
79. Id.
80. See Athey & Mobius, supra note 27.
81. CHIOU & TUCKER, supra note 77, at 4.
82. See Neuburger, supra note 31 (discussing recently settled copyright
litigation by AP and the parent company of the Boston Globe).
83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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of an implied license, the SDNY sheds valuable light on how
courts will handle these issues, and may undermine the ability
of aggregators to serve beneficial public functions.
II. CASE DESCRIPTION
It is not surprising that when Meltwater began doing
business in the United States it assumed it was protected by
fair use.84 Nevertheless AP filed a copyright infringement suit
in February 2012, leading to both sides submitting cross
motions for summary judgment in November 2012.85 The
Complaint alleged that Meltwater indexed and distributed
excerpts that were at the “heart” of the copyrighted articles,
with no licensing agreement.86 However, Meltwater contended
that it had licensing agreements with websites that did not
make its information freely available on the Internet, saying
that they just take free public articles (normally from a licensee
of AP) without a licensing agreement.87 Meltwater’s relevant
contentions were that it operates like a search engine,
therefore expanding public access to information, and that by
not employing technology to disallow the scraping of its freely

84. See Defendant’s Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims at 30–31,
Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537
(S.D.N.Y 2013) (No. 2:12-CV-01087-DLC-FM) [hereinafter Defendant’s
Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims] (“Meltwater launched Meltwater
News in the United States on the understanding that its processes for
indexing news sources publicly available on the Internet and returning short
snippets of articles in the form of search results responsive to its users’ queries
fall within the fair-use doctrine . . . .”).
85. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). It is worth noting that AP hired a group to inquire
about a Meltwater subscription, and Meltwater ended up giving the agent a
free trial. Defendant’s Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims, supra note
84, at 39–40. AP was asking for statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504, and
attorney’s fees pursuant to § 505. Complaint at 33, Associated Press v.
Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (No. 12CV-01087) [hereinafter Meltwater Complaint].
86. See Meltwater Complaint, supra note 85, at 29–30. The Complaint
alleges that Meltwater stored all or portions of copyrighted articles since 2007,
it did not pay licensing fees to AP like some of Meltwater’s competitors, and
that it was a closed system available only to subscribers, so was in no way
expanding public access. Id. at 29–32.
87. See Defendant’s Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims, supra note
84, at 34 (discussing how Meltwater has entered into agreements and is
specifically given permission to access and index news content that publishers
have chosen not to make freely available to the public).
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published articles, AP granted an implied license.88 The SDNY
had to decide whether Meltwater was akin to a search engine,89
or was a “classic news clipping” service not entitled to fair
use.90
A. FAIR USE ANALYSIS
The court made clear that the purpose of fair use is to
provide the flexibility needed in order to avoid “rigid
application” of the Copyright Act that undermines the very
creativity the statute intends to promote.91 In determining
whether the use is “fair,” the court was guided by the four
factors enumerated in § 107, which are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.92

In line with Supreme Court precedent, the court stated that all
the factors are to be explored together and weighted to best
promote the intended purpose of the Copyright Act.93 Finally,
because fair use is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof
rested on Meltwater.94
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
First, the court analyzed “the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes,”95 and found the factor

88. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (discussing the fair use defense as
Meltwater’s “principal defense” but Meltwater also argued that it had an
implied license). Meltwater also had affirmative defenses of equitable
estoppel, laches, and copyright misuse, but these are not relevant for this
comment. Id.
89. Id. at 541, 556 (assuming for the purposes of the opinion that a search
engine’s use of copyrighted work was transformative).
90. Id. at 561.
91. Id. at 550 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
577 (1994)).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
93. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 550–51.
94. Id. at 550.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 (“[W]hether the new
work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose of different character, altering the first
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weighed in favor of AP. Essentially the first factor boils down to
(1) whether or not the use is “transformative”; and (2) to what
extent it actually transforms the copyrighted work.96 The court
found the use was not transformative because Meltwater did
not add commentary or insight, and just automatically
captured and republished portions of copyrighted works.97 The
court did not accept Meltwater’s contention that it operates as
a search engine, stating that there was no evidence offered to
show that consumers used Meltwater to access the original
copyrighted works.98 Therefore as opposed to transforming the
content as a means of promoting access to information,
Meltwater’s consumers’ use of the service demonstrated it was
being used as a way of supplanting the need for the original
news article.99 The court concluded that “the purpose and
character of Meltwater’s use of AP’s articles weigh against a
finding of fair use.”100

with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether
and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’” (citations omitted)
(quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901))).
Aside from being transformative, a court is to consider whether it is
commercial or not for profit, but it has been made clear by the Supreme Court
that this is more about whether or not the defendant is exploiting the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
96. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
97. Id. at 552. Note that Meltwater is an “automatic” news aggregator,
and not a “website” that adds commentary or some other form of creative
value. See supra Part I.A.
98. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 554. Courts have generally found search
engines’ indexing and caching of copyrighted material as transformative since
it serves the valuable purpose of connecting the public to information. Id. at
555 (discussing two search engine copyright infringement cases). However, the
court made clear that Meltwater had a specific burden to show that their
specific use was fair, not that they just operated as a search engine using the
same technology and scraping process. Id. at 556.
99. See id. at 554 & n.13 (regarding the thirty-three articles in question,
Meltwater users only “clicked-through” to the original source .08% of the time,
whereas a source relied on by the court stated Google News had a clickthrough rate of 56%). The court concluded that “[i]nstead of driving
subscribers to third-party websites, Meltwater News acts as a substitute for
news sites operated or licensed by AP.” Id. at 554.
100. Id. at 557.
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2. Nature of Copyrighted Work
The court ruled in favor of Meltwater on the second
factor.101 The court broke down the second factor into two
separate analyses: (1) whether the work is creative, like a work
of fiction, or if it is more factual; and (2) whether the work is
published or not.102 Since the scope of fair use is broader for
factual reporting (rather than creative works) and for
published material (rather than more private unpublished
works), the court ruled in favor of Meltwater and a finding of
fair use.103
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Copying
The court ruled in favor of AP in regards to the third
factor.104 In analyzing the substantiality of copying, the court
broke the analysis down into quantitative (the portion taken in
relation to the whole), and qualitative dimensions (the
importance of the expressive components taken).105 In terms of
the quantitative analysis, the court stated that “no bright-line
rule exists with respect to how much copying is too much.”106 In
comparing Second Circuit precedent, Meltwater’s use of
anywhere from 4.5% to 61% of any given article was viewed as
excessive, in light of the “character and purpose” of the
secondary use.107 In further supporting this conclusion, the
court relied on the qualitative aspects of the analysis, stating
that Meltwater “automatically took the lede from every AP
story.”108 The court discussed the creative nature of a “lede” as
it is meant to convey the heart of the entire story and “is a
sentence that takes significant journalistic skill to craft.”109
Meltwater tried to argue that the lede was not meant to
summarize the article, but instead was supposed to serve as a
“teaser” that draws the reader in.110 The court dismissed the
argument, saying that if that was the case, it only undermines
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 559.
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Meltwater’s fair use defense since it would further highlight
the creative and artistic skill necessary to craft an intriguing
lede.111 Overall, the court ruled in favor of AP on this factor
because, coupled with the analysis above, Meltwater did not
offer any evidence to prove that it only used as much as
necessary to direct users to the original content.112
4. The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market or Value of
the Work
The court ruled in favor of AP on the fourth factor stating
that the use by Meltwater served as a substitute for the
original copyrighted work and undermined AP’s ability to fairly
operate within the market.113 The final prong in § 107 requires
a court to “consider not only the extent of the market harm
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort
engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially
adverse impact on the potential market for the original.”114
More specifically, the analysis hinges on whether the secondary
use substitutes for the original in the market, not whether it
suppresses or destroys the market of the original.115 The court
found that the fourth factor weighed heavily against Meltwater
since AP obtains licensing fees from businesses within the
same commercial market as Meltwater.116 Therefore, by not
paying a licensing fee and operating within the same
established market, Meltwater gained an unfair competitive
advantage over other licensees of AP’s content.117
5. The Aggregate Assessment of All the Factors
The court rejected Meltwater’s fair use defense, relying
heavily on the facts that the use was not transformative,
Meltwater’s business model directly competed with AP, and

111. Id.
112. Id. at 558–59. The court found it significant that the “snippets” used
by Meltwater were significantly smaller in its foreign operations. Id.
113. Id. at 560–61.
114. Id. at 559 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
590 (1994)).
115. Id. at 560.
116. Id. at 560–61.
117. Id.
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Meltwater did not pay licensing fees.118 It was irrelevant that
Meltwater used search engine technology, since the Copyright
Act still requires an alleged infringer to show that their specific
use of copyrighted content was fair.119 In sum, Meltwater failed
to provide enough evidence that the use of AP content was fair
use.
B. IMPLIED LICENSE DEFENSE
Another affirmative defense argued by Meltwater was that
AP granted an implied license to use its content.120 Meltwater
argued that because the licensees of AP did not employ
“robots.txt”121—a protocol which allows each website to
communicate to Meltwater’s crawler technology not to use the
content—AP had acquiesced through conduct and granted a
nonexclusive license to Meltwater to redistribute the
copyrighted articles.122 The court ruled that AP did not grant
an implied license to Meltwater because the three required
elements were not satisfied.123 The court also stated that even
if other jurisdictional requirements were followed, there were
practical and policy concerns that weighed against a finding of
an implied license.124

118. See id. at 561 (“Examining the four factors individually, and
considering them as a whole in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act and
the fair use defense, Meltwater has failed to raise a material question of fact
to support its fair use defense.”).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998)) (“The
burden of proving that a license exists falls on the party invoking the
defense.”).
121. Id. at 563. Robots.txt is also known as the Robot Exclusion Standard.
Id.
122. Id. at 563.
123. Id. at 563–64; see also supra Part I.C (discussing the implied license
defense). While it is clear that Meltwater did not meet the three requirements
[(1) licensee requested the creation; (2) licensor made particular work and
delivered it to the licensee who requested it; (3) licensor intended that licensee
copy and distribute], other jurisdictions do not have such guidelines. See supra
Part I.C. For purposes of this analysis the reasoning provided explains why
the court denied the defense, even if the elements were not mandatory. See
Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (“Even those courts that do not require
evidence of each of these three elements do require evidence of a meeting of
the minds between the licensor and licensee such that it is fair to infer that
the licensor intended to grant a nonexclusive license.”).
124. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562–64.
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The court’s main policy reason in not accepting the implied
license defense focused on the fact that, if accepted, it would
shift the burden onto the copyright holder to affirmatively act
in order to ensure there was no misuse of the copyrighted
material.125 That would be in contrast to the basic concepts of
copyright law.126 The court also stated numerous practical
reasons for dismissing Meltwater’s implied license defense.
First, there would seemingly be no way to differentiate between
those crawlers that make fair use of the content and those that
do not.127 Second, AP and all of its licensees would have to
constantly update which crawler-utilizing websites were
allowed and which ones were not.128 Aside from failing to meet
the required elements,129 the court also found that there was no
meeting of the minds between AP and Meltwater, and for the
reasons discussed above, the implied license defense had to
fail.130
III. ANALYSIS OF MELTWATER AND IMPLICATIONS
GOING FORWARD
Since the application of the fair use defense is to be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis,131 it is difficult to assess the
actual impact of the Meltwater decision. Nevertheless,
Meltwater: (1) may undermine the ability of other aggregators
125. See id. at 563 (“[W]hat Meltwater is suggesting would shift the burden
to the copyright holder to prevent unauthorized use instead of placing the
burden on the infringing party to show it had properly taken and used
content.”).
126. See Jasiewicz supra note 13, at 846; see also Meltwater, 931 F. Supp.
2d at 564 (stating that “another policy reason” for not using the robots.txt to
enforce the Copyright Act, is that it would require websites concerned with
misuse to stop crawlers from using the content, which would run against the
interests of openness on the Internet).
127. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (“Meltwater has presented no
evidence to suggest that robots.txt instructions are capable of communicating
which types of use the copyright holder is permitting the web crawler to make
of the content or the extent of the copying the copyright holder will allow.”).
128. See id. at 563–64 (discussing how the system could automatically
allow all web crawlers access and just specify which ones were designated as
denied, but it seems difficult for a website to actively manage an accurate list
of the crawlers who were to be denied). One of the issues the court had was
that Meltwater reserved the right to ignore its placement on an exclusionary
list. Id. at 564 n.21.
129. See supra note 123.
130. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 562–64.
131. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
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to distribute and disseminate information to the public by
taking too narrow a view of what constitutes “transformative”
use;132 (2) raises difficult questions about the differences
between a search engine that is afforded fair use and a news
aggregator (which employs search engine technology) that is
not; and (3) raises questions about the feasibility of an implied
license framework as an alternative to the Copyright Act in
guiding the relations between content providers and news
aggregators.
A. THE COURT INTERPRETED “TRANSFORMATIVE USE” TOO
NARROWLY AND DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE BENEFITS
AGGREGATORS PROVIDE TO SOCIETY
A pivotal factor for the Meltwater court in determining
whether the use was fair was whether the use was
“transformative.”133 After all, in regard to the first statutory
factor under § 107 of the Copyright Act, the Second Circuit has
made it clear that the most important aspect of a court’s first
factor analysis is the transformative aspect, not the commercial
aspect.134 Therefore, if the court ruled in favor of Meltwater on
the first factor, the outcome of the case may have been
different.135 Even if the outcome remained the same, the court
still interpreted “transformative use” too narrowly and did not
acknowledge the benefit aggregators provide to society,136
thereby creating precedent that could stifle innovation and
information dissemination.
In regard to “transformative use,” the Supreme Court has
stated that the use should not supersede the original
copyrighted work, but “instead [should] add[ ] something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is
132. E.g., AP v. Meltwater, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://
www.eff.org/cases/ap-v-meltwater (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
133. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
134. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608
(2d. Cir. 2006); see also Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150
F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (mentioning that the Second Circuit does not give
weight to the fact that the use was for commercial gain).
135. The court ruled in favor of Meltwater for the second factor. See supra
notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
136. See generally Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (showing that the
court does not talk about the public benefit).
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‘transformative.’”137 The Meltwater court seemed to dismiss the
idea that the snippets distributed to customers, although not
creative, were being used for a different purpose even if the
snippet was unaltered and there was no evidence that
consumers visited the original article.138 Instead the court
relied on the fact that customers rarely clicked through to the
original article, assuming they were using the snippets of three
hundred characters as a substitute for the original.139 This
interpretation is too narrow because the Supreme Court has
specifically mentioned that a use can be transformative if the
use adds something new “with a further purpose.”140
In this particular case, Meltwater failed to provide enough
evidence to show that its customers were using the snippets for
something other than a substitute for the original story.141
However, in future scenarios, what if a news aggregator can
show that its commercial consumers only use the snippets for
monitoring how frequently it is mentioned in the media and by
whom? Is that not a different “use”? The SDNY recently held
that Google’s systematic digitalization of copyrighted books was
transformative, in part because it changes the text of the books
into data.142 This was achieved by employing a word index
function that can search the frequency of any word throughout
various works.143 Using the technology, one could track the use
of a word through a set period in an attempt to study language.
By using the same type of search through the copyrighted
content, the consumer of a news aggregator can be using the
exact snippet of text, but for a different purpose than just
137. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
138. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
139. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (“Instead of driving subscribers
to third-party websites, Meltwater News acts as a substitute for news sites
operated or licensed by AP.”). The court mentions that Meltwater made a
“conscious decision” not to provide evidence in regards to how often their
customers click through to the original article. Id.
140. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
141. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 554–57 (discussing Meltwater’s
intentional withholding of information in regards to how its business is
utilized by customers).
142. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (“Google Books is also transformative in the sense that it has
transformed book text into data for purposes of substantive research,
including data mining and text mining in new areas . . . .”).
143. Id.
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reading the article. This “further use” should be viewed as
transformative since consumers of news aggregators may not
be using the snippet to substitute the need to read the original,
but for a different purpose. Holding that Meltwater’s use was
not transformative may create too narrow an interpretation of
what constitutes transformative use and may stifle the ability
of news aggregators to disseminate information to consumers
for different purposes.
This is not to say that Meltwater, in this specific case,
actually met its burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate
the use was fair in regards to the other factors,144 but if the
court had determined that the use was transformative, the
outcome may have been different when analyzing all of the
factors together under § 107.145 Since the Second Circuit, in
analyzing the first factor, places more weight on the
transformative aspect, as opposed to the commercial,146 it is
possible that if the use was ruled transformative, the first
prong would have weighed in favor of Meltwater. Regardless,
the court’s interpretation of what constitutes transformative
use may be too narrow, allowing future cases to rely on it and
undermine the very fair use protection which should be
afforded many news aggregators due to the benefit they provide
society.147 Aggregators increase access to information and
increase news consumption, thereby leading to a more informed
populous engaging in civic duties.148 The Meltwater court’s
narrow interpretation of “transformative” use does not
adequately take this into account. Courts going forward should
acknowledge that although some “automatic” aggregators’ use

144. See supra Part II.A.5. After all, in regards to the fourth prong,
Meltwater could not show that it was not having a negative impact on the
market and value of AP’s work. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 561
(mentioning that Meltwater side-stepped all arguments in relation to the
fourth prong and relied on the transformative nature of the use).
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 134.
147. For other issues with the interpretation outside of online news
aggregators, see AP v. Meltwater News: Summary & Questions, KELLY
WARNER L. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.aaronkellylaw.com/online-intellectualproperty/ap-meltwater-summary-questions/, discussing the possibility that a
company that produces a monthly newsletter with links to “how-to” articles
may be engaging in copyright infringement under the logic of the Meltwater
Court.
148. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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may be “minimally transformative,”149 news aggregators do
provide a benefit to society.150
B. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOGLE AND A SEARCH
ENGINE THAT EMPLOYS SEARCH ENGINE TECHNOLOGY?
Meltwater does not give any real guidance in terms of what
constitutes a search engine, or news aggregator employing
search engine technology, that is actually afforded fair use and
one that is not.151 On a more practical level, aside from the
strict analysis of the fair use factors, the court seemed to
differentiate Meltwater from other search engines because (1)
Meltwater’s consumers used the service differently than
Google’s consumers; and (2) Meltwater was not like other
search engines since it charged a fee for its service.152 While it
is true that Meltwater’s service is different than Google’s,
courts should not rely on these two factors in deciding which
aggregators using search engine technology are afforded fair
use, and which ones are not.
The court stated that although Meltwater utilized search
engine technology and provided such services to its customers,
it did not offer “a comparison between the click-through rate for
any single News Report and the rate for a single Google News
search or any other search for news conducted through a
recognized Internet search engine.”153 This means that whether
or not an aggregator or search engine is afforded fair use may
hinge not on what the business model is but actually on the
will of the consumer. For example, if an online business
provides a search engine service, but most consumers use it for
149. KIMBERLY ISBELL, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, THE RISE OF THE
NEWS AGGREGATOR: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 11 (2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670339.
Isbell states that even feed aggregators provide additional convenience,
organization, and greater access to news content and information, and
therefore are, at the very least, “minimally transformative.” Id.
150. Not to mention, as discussed in Part I.D., supra, they may even be
complementing news providers.
151. E.g., Nate Raymond, AP Win Against Meltwater Could Impact Online
News Aggregation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 26, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/mention/ap-win-against-meltwater-could-impact-onlinenews-aggregation.
152. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 553–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
153. Id. at 554; see also supra note 99 (discussing the comparison of clickthrough rates between Meltwater and Google).
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something the business did not intend, the online business may
be liable for copyright infringement. This is unfair to news
aggregators.
Another difference the court considered was that
Meltwater was not open to the public, like Google, and instead
charged a fee to a relatively small amount of consumers.154
While this may impact a court’s analysis in regard to the public
benefit that a search engine or aggregator provides, charging a
fee should not be used when analyzing whether or not
copyrighted material is being exploited. For example, is it
really the case that Google does not profit from advertising and
exploiting the content of others? Although Google clearly has
other ventures besides its basic search engine, it had over $15
billion in revenue just in the final quarter of 2013.155 Google is
not some non-profit entity that exists to provide public benefits.
It is one of the most successful companies in the world, whose
shares are currently trading for well over $1000 on security
exchanges.156 Again, it is true that Google does not charge
money for the use of its search engine and therefore is used by
a much larger portion of the population. However, courts
should not conclude that because Google does not charge a fee
in order to use its search engine, it somehow is not exploiting
copyrighted content in the same way as Meltwater is when
charging a fee.
Again, there may be other good reasons and factors that
differentiate a news aggregator (using search engine
technology) that is not afforded fair use and a search engine
that is. However, the difference should rest on how the
consumer utilizes the service or whether or not they charge a
fee to consumers. Future courts addressing the issue should
find other ways to differentiate between a search engine and a
news aggregator employing the same technology.

154. See Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 553–54.
155. Investor Relations, GOOGLE, https://investor.google.com/earnings/
2013/Q4_google_earnings.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
156. Google, Inc., WALL ST. J., http://quotes.wsj.com/GOOG (last visited
Feb. 25, 2014).
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C. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE IMPLIED LICENSE FRAMEWORK AS
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT
In denying Meltwater’s implied license defense,157 the
court incorrectly reasoned that the robots.txt opt-out system
would be undesirable even if the more expansive doctrine of
other jurisdictions was adopted. The expansion of the implied
license doctrine in the context of the robots.txt framework
essentially creates an opt-out system on the Internet where
copyright holders have to affirmatively act to prevent a news
aggregator or search engine from scraping their content.158 The
court’s main reasoning for dismissing the implied license
argument was because it was clear the three requirements,
utilized by many jurisdictions, were not met.159 This takes little
analysis, as it is obvious Meltwater fails the first factor by not
asking AP directly to make the copyrighted articles.160
However, the court recognized that some jurisdictions do not
require all of the elements and analyzed the defense under the
less often used, but more expansive, standard.161 In analyzing
the issue under the more flexible standard, the court
incorrectly ruled that the implied license defense would still
fail and went on to explain that such a standard is not
desirable or feasible.162 Going forward, courts should more
seriously consider the robots.txt system and an opt-out
framework (along with the implied license doctrine) as a
solution, outside of the Copyright Act, to govern the
relationships between online content providers and news
aggregators.163 Having an opt-out system where it is assumed
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
159. See Part II.B.
160. Compare supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing a common
standard for demonstrating an implied license, the first factor of which
requires the licensee to request the creation of the work), with supra note 123
and accompanying text (describing the Meltwater court’s rejection of
Meltwater’s implied license defense).
161. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the courts that do not require all three
elements, stating that only a fair inference that the licensor granted a
nonexclusive license was required, and concluding that Meltwater was unable
to point to any interaction that would demonstrate that either AP or one of
AP’s licensees granted a nonexclusive license).
162. See id.
163. But see Bart Van Besien, Google News Switches to “Opt-In” in
Germany to Avoid Copyright Fees, NEWMEDIA-LAW (Nov. 7, 2013, 3:16 PM),
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all news aggregators are entitled to scrape the Internet, unless
the copyright holder opts out, will create a better balance. It
will balance the benefits provided by news aggregators and the
content providers’ desire to single out select aggregators who
are not benefiting them through increased consumer traffic.
In analyzing Meltwater’s position under the more
expansive implied license doctrine, the court denied the
affirmative defense of an implied license because: (1) placing
the onus on the copyright holder to opt out of having
copyrighted material used contradicts the foundations of
copyright law; (2) there is no way to specify what types of use
were allowed and which uses were not; and (3) forcing AP or its
licensees to constantly update their robots.txt protocol every
time the list of licensees changes is not practical.164 Each
reason given by the court is analyzed below.
1. Copyright Owners Have Been Burdened Before
The Meltwater court stated that placing the burden on the
copyright holder would go against the foundations of the
current Copyright Act;165 however, it is not unheard of to place
an affirmative burden on copyright holders. For example, a
copyright holder is still required to register with the U.S.
Copyright Office and deposit the copyrighted works with the
Library of Congress in order to bring an infringement suit.166
Although the current Copyright Act does not seem compatible
with a policy where a copyright holder needs to opt out of their
content being infringed upon, the Internet presents new
challenges that could not have been anticipated in 1976.
Placing an affirmative burden on copyright holders is not
unusual and could be done in this situation.
2. Specific Uses Do Not Need to Be Specified
The Meltwater court stated that there would be no way for
a website to differentiate what kinds of “uses” it would allow

http://www.newmedia-law.com/news/google-news-switches-to-opt-in-ingermany-to-avoid-copyright-fees1/, for an example of an opt-in system in
Germany, where Google now will only display the results of websites and
content providers who affirmatively opt in.
164. Supra Part II.B.
165. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
166. See Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 846–47.

2014]

ASSOCIATED PRESS V. MELTWATER

1217

and would not allow.167 However, authors of robots.txt files can
be specific in terms of what content they do or do not want a
crawler to use.168 Furthermore, by understanding what
aggregators or websites do not have a licensing agreement to
use, an author of a robots.txt protocol could just not allow that
site to use the content, thereby undermining the need to specify
how a non-paying aggregator or search engine can use the
content.
3. Instead of Having a List of Who Is Allowed, Narrow It by
Who Is Not Allowed
The Meltwater court acknowledged that the use of the
robots.txt protocol could be used in a way where the website or
content provider had a list of all those who were not allowed, as
opposed to having to constantly “update their robots.txt
protocol to indicate which web crawlers had permission to visit
each site’s webpages.”169 While the court says it is hard to
imagine how a website could keep track of those they do not
allow, this actually seems quite feasible. Generally, many of
these websites want web crawlers to aid in the dissemination of
their content through aggregators and search engines.170
Therefore it seems completely feasible that instead of keeping
an updated list of who is allowed, a website or content provider
can utilize the robots.txt protocol to single out the crawlers
they believe are exploiting their content by not creating traffic
back to the original. This would be much easier and more
efficient than bringing a copyright infringement suit against
the aggregators or search engines the website did not want
distributing its content. Also, by creating a default that
aggregators can scrape information, the system allows for
further dissemination of information and a more informed
public.

167. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
168. See Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 844 (“Authors of robot.txt files can be
quite specific about what content they do and do not want indexed.”).
169. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 564; see also id. at 564 n.21 (stating it is
difficult to imagine a website effectively managing an accurate list of all
crawlers roaming the web and which ones are denied access).
170. Id. at 564 (discussing how the public and those on the Internet have
an interest in the “openness of the Internet,” and that denial of access would
only be limited in certain circumstances).
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Even though the Meltwater court is justified in ruling that
Meltwater failed to meet the burden required to demonstrate
an implied license because it did not meet the three elements
required under Second Circuit precedent, its reasoning for
discounting the robots.txt argument is unconvincing. The
expansion of the implied license defense and the
implementation of an opt-out system using the robots.txt
protocol technology should be utilized because it provides
protection against the exploitation of Internet media, while
balancing the benefit aggregators provide by further
disseminating information. Not only would this further the
purposes of the Copyright Act, but it avoids a situation where
Congress has to create additional legislation that would be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny,171 and would allow
content providers to utilize the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act since any circumvention of the robots.txt protocol would
constitute a circumvention of a safeguard that controls access
to copyrighted works.172 In sum, the court incorrectly dismissed
the robots.txt protocol argument as unworkable, and courts
going forward should not make the same mistake.
CONCLUSION
While it has long been thought that news aggregators were
protected from news providers by the fair use defense of the
Copyright Act, Meltwater demonstrates that this may not be
true. Although this was the first time a judgment had actually
been rendered against a news aggregator for copyright
infringement, it is noteworthy that the controversy ended like
other infringement suits do, just prior to appeal173—with a
licensing agreement or other mutually beneficial agreement.174
Therefore, it is unlikely this case will dramatically alter the
landscape.
Even if Meltwater does not completely alter the
relationship between news aggregators and news providers, it
is important that courts take a more expansive view of what is
“transformative,” since it is such a crucial part of the fair use
171. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
173. Supra Part I.D.
174. Associated Press, supra note 6 (discussing the partnership agreement
that was entered into between AP and Meltwater prior to Meltwater
appealing the adverse judgment to the Second Circuit).
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analysis. Weighing in favor of news aggregators on the first
factor will make it more likely that aggregators will be
protected by fair use. This is desirable because aggregators
increase news consumption, which leads to wider dissemination
of information and a more informed public.
The court’s analysis does provide some guidance for
aggregators in order to find protection under fair use. This
includes the implication that aggregators market themselves as
a search engine (or just not as a news clipping service) and
allow as many users to access the website (or service) as
possible. However, there are still important questions on how
best to classify an aggregation service that is protected by fair
use and one that is not.
Aside from being more flexible in terms of what constitutes
“transformative use,” courts should more seriously consider the
expanded implied license defense and opt-out framework
proposed by Meltwater. This way the aggregators may continue
to disseminate information broadly, while also giving the
copyright holder discretion to choose who is using the content.
This might be the best option for the future, since it is
questionable if the Meltwater court, in applying the fair use
factors, is being fair to aggregators.

***

